

Perception and Perceptual Error in Nyāya and Advaita Vedānta: A Comparative Review

Snehal Mane¹ and Rina Puradkar^{2*}

¹PhD Research Scholar, Department of Philosophy, Mumbai University

²Associate Professor, Ramniranjan Jhunjhunwala College of Arts, Science & Commerce (Autonomous),
Ghatkopar, Maharashtra, India

Abstract: This paper investigates the concept of perception (*Pratyakṣa*) and perceptual error in *Nyāya* and *Advaita Vedānta*. Though both the systems recognise perception as primary means of valid knowledge they vary conceptually in understanding the nature of object, self and consciousness, and the kind of knowledge perception reveals.

Nyāya's realism explains perception in terms of *sannikarṣa*: sense-object contact and resultant knowledge is the quality produced in self. By contrast *Advaita Vedānta* explains perception is the manifestation of self-luminous consciousness through the *vritti*, that removes veil of ignorance and knowledge of the object is disclosed not produced.

The paper analyses the concept of perception in *Nyāya* in terms of sense-object contact (*sannikarṣa*), and for *Advaita* through Anthakaran *vritti*, consciousness and self-luminosity. It also undertakes a comparative study of how perceptual knowledge is shaped by *Nyāya*'s realism and *Advaita*'s non-dualism and the concept of perceptual error in both the systems, to expound the epistemic depth.

Key words – Perception (*Pratyakṣa*), *Sannikarṣa*, Anthakaran *Vritti*, *Nyāya*, *Advaita Vedānta*

1. Introduction

In Indian philosophy, the definition of Perception (*pratyakṣa*) is in terms of how it is causedⁱ: perception is the knowledge arises from sense-object contact. We collect the sensory information from the world around us through our senses, interpret it and transform it into knowledge. In this process of cognition there is subject, object and arising knowledge. In the process of cognition, something remarkable takes place, a material object comes in contact with the sense, produces knowledge about the respective object. But what is the nature of this contact? Is it causal or disclosure or it is altogether different? What are the factors and stages involved in the process of perception? Does the perception always have the empirical ground or it shifts to transcendental to perceive the material world? what happens in the first moment of perception?

In Indian philosophy the *pramāṇa*'s are the means of valid knowledge. The six *pramāṇa*'s that produce knowledge, are *Pratyakṣa*, *Anumāna*, *Śabda*, *Upamāna*, *Arthāpatti* and *Anupalabdhi*. *Pramāṇa*'s provide authoritative source, justification of cognitive process, and evidence for the knowledge claimⁱⁱ. The *Shad-darshana*'s, six *āstika* schools, according to their metaphysics and epistemological framework debated the number and nature of *pramāṇa*'s. *Vaiśeṣika* admits perception and inference, *Sāṅkhya-yoga* adds testimony as third *pramāṇa*, though *Nyāya* accepts *Vaiśeṣika*'s metaphysics allowed *Upamāna* (analogy) and testimony as fourth *pramāṇa*. In *Mīmāṃsā* darshan, Prabhakara accepts *Arthāpatti* as the fifth *pramāṇa* and Kumarila Bhatta adding *Anupalabdhi* *pramāṇa* accepts all six. *Advaita Vedānta* system accepts all six *Pramāṇa*'s as reliable means of knowledge. Almost all the schools accept *Pratyakṣa* or perception as the primary means of valid knowledge, though they differ in definition based on their epistemological and metaphysical framework. The first moment of perception more or less remains same for all the schools. That is the contact between the sense and its respective object.

This paper examines *pratyakṣa* (Perception) *pramāṇa* in *Nyāya* and *Advaita Vedānta* and offers comparative analysis. While both *Nyāya* and *Advaita Vedānta* school accepts *pratyakṣa* as the instrument of valid knowledge, they completely differ in their fundamentals to establish *pratyakṣa pramāṇa* and how and what it discloses. *Nyāya* being realist school, proposes causal connection between sense-object contact (*sannikarṣa*) produces knowledge as quality in the self. Whereas *Advaita* put forth revelation of consciousness through the *vritti* (mental modification) which is direct, immediate perception. This paper outlines that their disagreement is not merely based on technical grounds but it is ontologically driven. *Nyāya* holds an object is independently real substance, and *Advaita* holds that an object is an appearance on Brahman. Their epistemologies are followed on their metaphysical framework. Further the paper explains the *Advaita* account of immediacy, self-luminosity and non-dual structure of perceptual knowledge and error that is difficult to accommodate in *Nyāya*'s causal framework.

2. Nyāya

Nyāya sutra on *pratyakṣa pramāṇa*: *indriyārthasannikarṣotpannam jñānam avyapadeśyam avyabhicāri vyavasāyatmakam pratyakṣam* (1.1.4)

Indriya-artha-sannikarṣa-utpannam- produced by the contact of the senses and their objects.

Jñanam- knowledge or cognition

Avyaptadesam- not based on words, names (non-verbal or non-conceptual) or indeterminate

Avyabhikari- non-erring

Vyavasayatmakam- well defined, determinate

Aksapada Gautama defines, perceptual knowledge which arises from the contact of a sense with its object, which is determinate, unnameable and non-erratic. Doctrine of perception is three-fold contact; 1] contact between sense and object, 2] contact between mind and sense and 3] contact between soul and mind. Later *Nyāyayika* 's Gangesa finds this definition is too wide and too narrow, to avoid this, he adds perception as a direct apprehension. Also, Aksapada's definition of perception do not distinguish between the knowledge that is immediate or mediate.

- It is too wide (what it includes)- knowledge that arises from sense-object contact includes recollection or memory, which is the contact between the mind and the image and the inference about the soulⁱⁱⁱ. For *Nyāya* soul is a substance an eternal and all pervading, locus of knowledge. Soul is not perceived directly but it is inferred through the experience of cognition, desire, pain, pleasure. These inner states perceived directly by mind, are referred as mental perception or *Manah pratyakṣa*^{iv}. For these internal states the substrate is the soul, they are the qualities of the soul, and soul is inferred through these states. It means the perception of soul is not direct it is mediated through mind. Knowledge and consciousness belong to the soul as an attribute, it belongs to the soul only in its embodied condition and is therefore accidental^v. Gangesa here tries to differentiate between perception and inference which is closely connected to sense experience.
- It is too narrow (what it excludes)^{vi} - God is omniscient, eternal and cannot be perceived by physical sense organs. If we follow Aksapada's definition of perception then God's perception is excluded. So Gangesa claims it is too narrow.
- Gangesa further adds "knowledge whose instrumental (*kāraṇa*) cause is not knowledge."^{vii} *Nyāya* accepts four *pramāṇa* 's or four means to valid knowledge. Except *pratyakṣa* rest three means underline the instrumental cause. In inference we require prior knowledge when we claim "where there is smoke there is fire." In comparison we require prior knowledge to see the similarity. And in verbal testimony we require the meaning and consistency of words as prior knowledge. So, the prior knowledge becomes the instrumental cause for the other three *pramāṇa* 's. According to Gangesa, *pratyakṣa* is the primary, independent means of knowledge and other *pramāṇa* 's depend on perception. In perception our sense organ eye, ear etc. are the instruments itself. The contact of sense to its respective object without any prior knowledge or mediation arises the perceptual knowledge.
- Gangesa adds third important point in definition that is directness, immediacy of perception or direct apprehension^{viii} not reached through memory or reasoning. Technically the directness is called *aparokṣā*, non-mediated.
- *Nyāya* being realist school believes that knowledge reveals both subject and object which are distinct from itself. Subject and object are real and exist independently, knowledge is medium manifests the relation between them. Right knowledge (*pramā*) is right apprehension of an object (*Yathārthānubhava*)^{ix}. And invalid knowledge includes memory, doubt, error.

2.1. - 6 types of ordinary Sannikarsa - the word shows the contact between sense (indriya) and its object (vishaya) to produce knowledge.

Samyoga (Union) – conjunction or *samyoga* is a temporary relation between two substances which can exist separately. in visual perception, direct contact between a visual sense and its object, (not the physical organ directly).

Samyuktasamavāya (United inherence) - contact with an object that is qualified by a quality. in visual perception there is a union of our eye with Jar in which the colour inheres such as seeing colour of a jar.

Samyukta-samaveta-samavāya (United inherent inherence) - perceiving a feature or a quality, in visual perception of a jar, there is a union with the jar in which inherence of colour wherein again abides colour ness in the relation. like the genus or class of a colour.

Samavāya^x (Inherence)- *samavāya* is an eternal relation between two entities, one of which cannot exist without the other.

Samaveta-samavāya (Inherent inherence) – in the auditory perception there is inherence of soundness in sound which again inheres in the ether.

Viśeṣanatā (Particularity) – in the visual perception of non-existence of a jar on a ground.

2.2 - Kinds of perception

Laukika Pratyakṣa (ordinary) - In our ordinary perception we perceive through five senses and the mind. Ordinary perception further classified as external and internal perception. Our five sense organs are external organs, and the perception received through

external senses is external ordinary perception. mind regarded as the internal organ, we receive cognition of pain, pleasure, desire, aversion etc; through mind. This is called as internal perception.

Alaukika Pratyakṣa (extra-ordinary) - transcendent perception- the direct cognition of the object is cognized in special manner is included in this category.

1] *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* - samanya or universal in character, commonness which is present in all objects of the same type. It is cognised by any sense organ but it is known directly.

2] *jñānalakṣaṇa* - when we see ripe mangoes, we also cognise the sweet-sour taste without actually tasting mangoes (includes recollection). Our eyes cannot cognize the taste but we get the knowledge of the taste of mangoes along with the visual perception. Such compound cognition is *jñānalakṣaṇa*.

3] *yogaja lakṣaṇa* – perception of an Ascetic who attained union with the supreme being. A yogi gets the knowledge of past and future things, events without sense perception but in extraordinary manner. This knowledge is *yogaja lakṣaṇa*.

2.3 - Perception is also divided into two kinds^{xi} indeterminate (*nir-vikalpa*) and determinate (*savikalpa*). Indeterminate perception is without any words and concepts, only an immediate awareness of the object. It is an initial contact that something is there. After the first moment the mind begins to compare, remember, recognize qualities and classify. It becomes mediated perception, where memory, concepts, words and time-space relation are involved. In Determinate perception the cognition of an object is mediated by mind and it is perceived with some character and qualities.

3. Advaita Vedānta:

Sutra on Pratyakṣa Pramāṇa: *tatra pratyakṣapramāṇākāraṇampratyakṣaPramāṇam*^{xii} 1/1

Of these that which is the distinctive cause (*kāraṇa*) of valid perceptual (*pratyakṣa*) knowledge is the *pramāṇa pratyakṣa*.

Vedānta paribhasa begins by giving the definition as *pratyakṣa pramāṇa* is the means to perceptual knowledge. For *Advaita* the knowledge is not only the sense object contact and the mind processing the information, but knowledge is actually consciousness itself. Vedānta shift their focus towards *Aparokṣā* (immediate awareness). For this the structure of Anthakaran, vritti and consciousness is important.

1. Anthakaran is consist of four components i.e. mind, intellect, ego and citta. Mind that creates doubts and difficulties. Intellect takes decision, judging, willing and wishing. Ego is the sense of 'I', and citta is interpreted as memory. Perception undergoes these four functions.

2. Vritti is interpreted as mental modification, but they are different from Yoga vritti, is understood as an obstacle on the path of liberation. Here the mental modification or vritti reaches to object and takes the shape of an object to reveal the object of knowledge.

3. Three types of consciousness in the process of perception. Content consciousness: appearing as object, cognitive consciousness: associated with mental modification (vritti), and cognisor consciousness: associated with the knower (subject).

Vedānta foundation is: the ultimate reality is only one, non-dual awareness and the highest goal of human life is liberation. Liberation is Brahman knowledge which is immediate and direct. The first *pramāṇa pratyakṣa* is based on these principles.

3.1 Perception consist of 5steps^{xiii} -

1] Mind through the sense of vision reaches to the object and coincides with it. 2] Mental modifications (vritti) removes the veil for the perceiver. 3] consciousness that underlines the object, illumines the object. 4] As an effect, difference collapses temporarily, there is a connection between the consciousness that underlies the object and the one that underlies the subject. 5] As a result the subject perceives the object.

Initially there is sense contact with its respective object. Mind is finite can create vritti^{xiv} (mental modification) reaches to the object and takes the form of an object. During perception consciousness manifest through object forming vritti of the mind. This vritti is illumined by object consciousness, results in immediate and direct knowledge. The object consciousness and the subject consciousness coincides and the difference collapses temporarily, knower, knowing, and known is unified in perception. The separateness is conceptual, not ontological, as consciousness playing at three levels. Perception is immediate because consciousness reveals their non-difference. Perception doesnot happen externally it converses within consciousness.

3.2 Self - Luminosity: Consciousness is ever present, self-luminous (*svarupajñāna*), consciousness without differentiation of the knower, the known, and the knowledge is *svarupa- jñāna*. Self-luminosity means that a cognition does not depend on another cognition to be known^{xv}. Every object exists as Brahman appearing in that form. The real identity of an object is Brahman consciousness that is veiled by ignorance. Upon illumination the vritti removes the veil of the object disclosing the consciousness

that was always present in the object. This is the moment of immediacy *aparokṣa*. Knowledge of an object is not produced as something new, but it is consciousness itself.

Perception of Brahman is immediate because Brahman is not an object, so there is no duality of subject -object. Consciousness is never separate from itself. It does not require mediation of mind, concepts, words. Brahman is self illuminous and realized directly after the removal of ignorance. And the ignorance is removed through scriptures, Guru, inquiry.

4. *Khyātivāda*- is perceptual error, a theory of erroneous perception. Standard example shared as snake-rope, is analysed in systematic and elaborative manner.

4.1 *Nyāya* Theory of Error:

Anyathākhyātivāda is a view advocated by the *Naiyayika* 's. According to this, in an erroneous cognition, the attributes of one thing are superimposed on a different thing, and so the object appears as something other than what it is. Thus, error is misapprehension as it does not correspond to the real object.

In the snake and rope example, what is the real cognition from the realist position of *Nyāya*? was it the experience of rope or snake?

For *Nyāya* the snake is a real thing but it exists somewhere and mistakenly presented here. In the dim light the *sannikarṣa* is imperfect, the complete nature of rope is not seen clearly and the false apprehension of snake is misrelated and misplaced. At that moment causal connection triggers memory (*saṃskāra*), the memory of snake gets fused with the present visual contact of rope. This kind of perception is not complete because it involves memory also it is erroneous. *Nyāya* calls it *Jñānaḥ pratyakṣa*^{xvi} (extraordinary perception) through the mediation of prior knowledge.

By saying the snake is real, exist somewhere, *Nyāya* removes the non-existence character, grounds in real memories of real objects. Here memory is trying to bridge the gap of causal connection, because the experience of snake was real at that moment.

4.2 *Advaita Vedānta* school theory of error^{xvii} - *Anirvacanīyakhyātivāda*

According to this view the snake cognised on the rope is neither real or nor unreal, nor both real or unreal. This undefinable snake is created by our ignorance or *avidyā* on account of some defect in the senses. Ignorance conceals the form of an existing object and constructs the appearance of another object. In the dim light ignorance conceals the real object rope with the features of snake, in the bright light the knowledge is dawn and it reveals the real object rope. The creation of an undefinable (*Anirvacanīya*) illusory object is the special feature of *anirvacanīyakhyāti*. *Advaita* rejects the false cognition^{xviii}.

Why the error took place? We cannot conclude that the error is imagination, *Advaitin* 's (*Gauḍapāda*) will reject it by saying it was (*vikalpa*)^{xix} our failure to understand something properly. *Vikalpa* term is difficult to interpret; *Gauḍapāda* means by it is 'wrong interpretation' of what is presented to senses. Later Śāṅkara introduces the term superimposition^{xx} for wrong interpretation, he defines it as appearance in the form of a memory. At the heart of our confusion is the notion of *avidyā*. This superimposition Śāṅkara claims is common core of everyone's theory of error, we are prone to superimpose the properties of object of awareness on its subject. That is, we identify our self (consciousness) with our body, mind, memory etc. primary this superimposition consists of ignorance (*avidyā*) and this confusion is needed to be removed through knowledge.

4.3 - With the universal example of rope and snake, does the snake has some similar character that was identical to rope? Because two completely different objects consisting different character may not give perceptual error. The waviness, colour of rope triggered the memory of the characteristic of snake giving us the perceptual knowledge of snake at that moment. Does this mean for the error to even take place the object of real perception and the object of erroneous perception should carry some identical characteristics?

The similarity between the two objects is the necessary precondition of error to sufficiently address *Anyathā khyāti* and *Anirvacanīya khyāti*. For *Nyāya* the snake is a real thing but it exists somewhere, misrelated and misplaced^{xxi} to the present perception. *Advaita* defines it as *adhyāsa*, superimposition on the rope due to *avidyā*. This error works in three stages; first in sense object contact the resemblance of the features between the rope and snake (it doesnot take place between rope and pot or rope and tree), then association through similarity gives rise to a memory of a different object with some of those perceived attributes^{xxii}. In the partial perception in dim light there is superimposition of the structural features, error occurs, when perceiver fails to discriminate between the perception and the memory.

In case of error, for *Nyāya* the extraordinary perception with *sannikarṣa* similarity also is operative. For *Advaita* if error is claimed as *adhyāsa* a superimposition, similarity is contributing factor whereas concealment and projection^{xxiii} are two complementary effects of *añāna*. So, for both the school's similarity becomes the necessary condition of perceptual error. The rope-snake illusion is possible not only because ignorance or mis-relation but because the real object rope shares the perceptual and structural features with the snake i.e. waviness, colour, shape etc, this raises questions that is similarity is sufficient ground for perceptual error? Is the similarity being the universal shared by the particular as *Nyāya* holds? Is the condition of similarity points out to the shared ground of being as *Advaita* holds? The similarity which is appeared here in perceptual knowledge is same as recollection?

In our ordinary perception one is aware of the object, the mental image is influenced by the past experience or *saṃskāras*. While perceiving the object directly, we are aware of the object directly and not the mental image. However, during illusion this mental

image is operative. Even when the illusion is corrected we can not claim the mental image is non-existent because it was present in our ordinary experience. Therefore, the status of mental image in illusion is not fully real or completely unreal, it is intermediate^{xxiv}.

5 Comparative analysis

Nyāya being a Realist school and *Advaita Vedānta* being Non-dualist school, disagrees in the fundamental process of perception and the elements involved in it.

1. what is the nature of the object – *Nyāya*’s Real substance as a substrate Vs *Advaita*’s appearance on Brahman

Nyāya - Substance or dravya is the substratum which inheres actions and qualities, independent nature of things. *Nyāya*’s *Samavāya Sannikarṣa*, or inherence, is defined as the eternal connection between two things that cannot exist separately from each other. Substance is real matter and consciousness as *samavāya*, inherited as quality of substance

Advaita - Brahman consciousness is the substrate for everything. The world is the appearance on Brahman, dependent on Brahman for its existence. *Advaita* do not require any relation between Brahman and Appearance, because it doesnot add anything to Brahman. The world never inheres in Brahman, it is the concealment on Brahman due to *avidyā*.

The object is real and independent for *Nyāya*, for *Advaita* empirical reality of object is not denied. The underline consciousness is responsible to give the knowledge of an object.

2. what is the nature of the self (consciousness)? - substance with knowledge Vs. Pure consciousness

Nyāya - There are innumerable souls all-pervading spiritual substance. Self or spirit is one of the nine substances, that is real, eternal and independent. Consciousness is the accidental attribute possessed by the self and not the quality because it is not there during the deep sleep^{xxv}. Knowledge arises in the self through the causal chain, self is the passive recipient of cognition. Liberation comes through knowledge, it is absolute cessation of all life, all consciousness, all bliss. Liberated souls retain its own individuality and particularity and remains as it is^{xxvi}.

Advaita - Self is consciousness, self-luminous, cannot be object of knowledge, non-different from Brahman, and present in all three states of consciousness that is waking, dream and deep sleep. *Māyā* makes the one Brahman appear as the many that is the world^{xxvii}. Self is the ground without it cognition is not possible. Liberation is really being liberated from *avidyā*, the dawn of true knowledge about one’s self and the identity with Brahman. *Mokṣa* is not the attainment of new state but the realisation of what one always has been^{xxviii}. There is no cessation but revealing the true nature of consciousness.

3. what is the nature of knowledge? - produced Vs. self-luminous

Nyāya - self is the locus of knowledge, it is a new entity and causally (through *sannikarṣa*) arises. It is produced once the causal chain is complete, that is object to sense to mind to self. Before cognition the self is passive. During cognition the knowledge inheres in self as quality. After cognition the self-returns to its prior state. *Nyāya* distinguishes between valid and invalid knowledge. Valid knowledge is produced by the four *pramāṇa*’s and the validity of knowledge is externally established that is extrinsic (*partah pramānya*).

Advaita Vedānta - knowledge is not the quality of the self, it is the very nature of Brahman, as it is self-luminous. Knowledge is not new, because consciousness is ever present was always there, it is concealed and the *vritti* (mental modification) only removes the concealment. Truth of cognition is intrinsic (*svataḥ pramānya*)

If the knowledge is produced as a new entity as *Nyāya* claims, then before the perception the object was not known and the subject was not conscious. At the first moment of sense -object contact what is aware of this process? The self is unconscious by default and it becomes conscious when the *sannikarṣa* takes place. For *Advaita*, causal connection only appears within consciousness. According to *Advaita*, consciousness is self-luminous, it does not require any thing external. Consciousness was always present only it varies in its appearance. Because Brahman consciousness is substrate for existence. So, knowledge is not a new entity produced, it is only disclosure.

4. Immediacy in *Nyāya* and *Advaita*

Immediacy is understood in *Nyāya* as direct apprehension, without inference. The object is matter and the physical sense contact is also matter, then how the immediacy can take place in the absence of consciousness? The first moment of perception raises important questions about the cognition, awareness. *Navya Naiyayika*’s explained the directness of perception is without any inference or mediation. But it is still a causal chain from object to sense to mind to self. *Advaita* may call it mediated perception. Because for *Advaita*, the structure of 3 kinds of consciousness subject, object and cognition shares the same ontological base, there is no mediation, perception is *aparokṣā*, immediate.

5.1 - Conclusion

This paper undertakes a comparative examination of perception and perceptual error in *Nyāya* and *Advaita Vedānta* demonstrating epistemic differences and distinct ontological status. The irreconcilable metaphysical ground of both *Nyāya* and *Advaita* systems, raises significant questions about what the object is, what the self is and what knowing ultimately is. *Nyāya* being realist perceives object as real independent substance, though *Advaita* perceives object as an appearance on Brahman, do not deny empirical reality.

The process of perception moves from empirical to transcendental for *Advaita*. The nature of knowledge for *Advaita* is consciousness itself, always present, only concealed due to ignorance and it is disclosed in the light of consciousness. For *Nyāya* knowledge is new entity causally produced.

The purpose of examining the two opposite schools is not to state one is correct and other is wrong. The paper must be read in the spirit that tries to identify the metaphysical limitations, ontological status that can deepen our philosophical understanding

- *Nyāya* lays a very rigorous account of perception, saying world is real does not dissolve in subjective experience, nor it is depending on subjective experience. Problem is “first moment of perception”, who is aware of the causal connection? Who cognised the knower? Besides pot cognition there must be one more cognition about the knower. If another knower is required then it will be infinite regress. *Nyāya* leaves open question concerning status of the self, prior to cognition.
- *Advaita* addresses this problem by giving the doctrine of self-luminous consciousness, object appears in consciousness and consciousness underlying cognition is self-revealing. It is the same consciousness operates on different level as content consciousness, cognition consciousness. According to *Advaita* if consciousness is ever present in perception as in the object and the subject, then why perception does not happen always or it happens sometime?
- The ontological status of snake as understood in *Advaita* that is not real or unreal, indescribable (*anirvacanīya*), requires further development on phenomenological level. If rope (content) consciousness is already present, why it allows superimposition? The *vritti* consciousness is affected by external factors like dim light creates illusion due to similarity, then the first moment of perception only reveals something as it is supported by snake memory. Is it a concealment or mis-construction of object identity?

Nyāya and *Advaita Vedānta* agrees that *pratyakṣa* is the valid means of knowledge yet they disagree with the scope and completeness of knowledge it provides. For *Nyāya*, perceptual knowledge is valid when it corresponds to reality or to independently existing object. Though *Advaita* accepts empirical reality the knowledge gain of the real world is of lower level, because it is the appearance on Brahman, and it do not disclose the ultimate nature of object as Brahman. From *Advaita* perspective perceptual knowledge is incomplete. *Nyāya* stops at empirical level whereas *Advaita* extends inquiry towards non-dual reality (transcendental). Even in perceptual error both the traditions differ, the snake illusion is corrected by rope for *Nyāya*, but for *Advaita* the rope itself is sublated by Brahman consciousness. The difference between the two systems may therefore be understood in terms of completeness and validity of knowledge. The comparative study of *Nyāya* and *Advaita Vedānta* reveals complementary philosophical perspectives, the structure of independent empirical reality and the self-luminous consciousness both is required for perceptual knowledge.

ⁱ Roy W Perrett, An Introduction to Indian Philosophy, p 119

ⁱⁱ Roy W Perrett, An Introduction to Indian Philosophy, p 103

ⁱⁱⁱ Satischandra Vidyabhushan, The Tattva Chintamani- vol 1, p11

^{iv} C.D.Sharma, Indian Philosophy: A Critical Survey, p 166

^v S.Radhakrishnan, History of Philosophy Eastern and Western vol-1, p225

^{vi} Satischandra Vidyabhushan, The Tattva Chintamani- vol 1, p11

^{vii} Ibid11

^{viii} Gangesha Upadhyaya, Tattva Chintamani, p11

^{ix} Roy W Perrett, An Introduction to Indian Philosophy, p 115

^x Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan-Editorial Board, History of Philosophy Eastern and Western vol-1, p227

^{xi} Ibid221

^{xii} Adhvarin Dharmaraja, Vedantaparibhasa p7

^{xiii} Gupta Bina, Perceiving in Advaita Vedanta: Epistemological Analysis and Interpretation, p 49

^{xiv} Ibid p97-29, *Vritti* is defined as mental modification. They are not obstacles as treated in *sankhya-yoga*. *Vritti* in *Advaita* is treated as mental modification that assumes the form of an object, after assuming the form of an object enters into *anthakaran* (internal sense), which is a passive instrument illumined by the *saksin*. The internal sense effects the connection between the *vritti* and pure consciousness.

^{xv} Ibid p 62

^{xvi} Roy W Perrett, An Introduction to Indian Philosophy p133

^{xvii} Beena Gupta, Perceiving Advaita, p96-26, Śankara defines superimposition as the “apparent presentation (to consciousness) in the form of remembrance of something previously experienced in something else.” it is the result of positive identification between what is remembered and what is perceived.

^{xviii} Roy W Perrett, An Introduction to Indian Philosophy, p 134

^{xix} Karl potter, Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophy p68. Gaudapada also uses *Maya* synonymously to *Vikalpa*. Shankara develops his own terminology that is superimposition for expressing it.

^{xx} IbidP69

^{xxi} Roy W Perrett, An Introduction to Indian Philosophy, p 133

^{xxii} Ibid p132

^{xxiii} P. Sankaranarayana, What is Advaita? P48

^{xxiv} Bhattacharya Kalidas, Advaita Vedānta A modern Understanding p3, 4-5

^{xxv} C.D.Sharma, Indian Philosophy: A Critical Survey, p 165

^{xxvi} ibd 174 – as long as soul will go on performing actions, it will be bound. To attain liberation the soul is separated from the fetters of mind and the body and realises its own pure nature. In liberation qualities do not exist because the soul is no longer connected to mind and body.

^{xxvii} P. Sankaranarayana, What is Advaita? P47

^{xxviii} Ibid p78

References

- [1] Satischandra Vidyabhushan, edited by Pt. Kamakhyanatha Tarkavagisa, The Tattva-Chintamani of Gangesa Upadhyaya, vol-1-Pratyaksa khanda, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi 1897, ISBN-8426-0580-0
- [2] Adhvarin Dharmaraja, edited by S.S.Suryanarayana Sastri 1942, Vedantaparibhasa, Vasanta Press, Adyar, Madras,
- [3] Potter Karl-1981, Encyclopaedia of Indian Philosophies Vol-III, Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, Delhi. ISBN: 81-208-0310-8
- [4] Bhattacharya Kalidas 1975, A Modern Understanding of Advaita Vedanta, Dalsukh Malvania, L.D.Institute of Indology, Ahmedabad.
- [5] S.Radhakrishnan 1952, History of Philosophy Eastern and Western vol-1, George Allen & Unwin Ltd,
- [6] Gupta Bina 1995, Perceiving in Advaita Vedanta: Epistemological Analysis and Interpretation, Motilal Banarsidass, Varanasi, ISBN:81-208-1296-9
- [7] P.Shankarnarayanan 1999, What is Advaita?, Bhavans Book University
- [8] Sharma C.D. 1962, Indian Philosophy: A Critical Survey, Great Britain by Rider & Company

Copyright & License:



© Authors retain the copyright of this article. This work is published under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (CC BY 4.0), permitting unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.