

INDIA'S CONSTITUTIONAL IDENTITY AT 100: DEMOCRACY, FEDERALISM, AND GOVERNANCE IN 2047

A Doctrinal and Policy-Foresight Study

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Abstract: This paper examines India's constitutional identity at the centenary of independence in 2047 through the linked lenses of democracy, federalism and governance. The central argument is that India's constitutional identity is not a static description of institutions created in 1950, but a living discipline of public power bounded by the Preamble, Fundamental Rights, Directive Principles, federal distribution of authority, constitutional morality and the basic structure doctrine. By 2047, India will operate in a setting of deep technological governance, larger urban settlements, higher citizen expectations, new fiscal pressures, climate adaptation, demographic transition, sharper subnational aspirations and stronger demands for accountability. In such a setting, the constitutional question will not be whether India remains a democracy in formal terms, but whether electoral competition, parliamentary deliberation, judicial review, independent institutions, local government, rights protection and cooperative federalism continue to work as a coherent system. The study follows a doctrinal and policy-foresight methodology, drawing upon constitutional text, landmark jurisprudence, official institutional sources and normative theory. It argues that Indian constitutional identity by 2047 must be understood as a triadic compact: democratic legitimacy, federal accommodation and governance capacity. The paper proposes reforms in electoral transparency, parliamentary oversight, intergovernmental consultation, fiscal federalism, local government finance, digital public infrastructure, algorithmic accountability, civil service capacity and citizen-centric service delivery. It concludes that the Constitution's endurance in 2047 will depend less on ceremonial fidelity and more on the everyday constitutionalisation of administration, technology and development.

IndexTerms - Constitutional identity, basic structure doctrine, democracy, federalism, fiscal federalism, governance capacity, constitutional morality, digital governance, India 2047.

I. INTRODUCTION

The year 2047 will mark one hundred years of India's independence and nearly a century of republican constitutional practice. It will therefore be a decisive moment for evaluating whether the constitutional project has matured merely as a legal order or as a civic, administrative and developmental identity. India's Constitution was framed for a society marked by civilisational depth, social stratification, linguistic plurality, regional diversity, partition trauma and developmental scarcity. Its central achievement was to convert diversity into a constitutional resource rather than a permanent source of fragmentation.

The phrase 'constitutional identity' is used here to denote the core commitments that give the Indian constitutional order its distinct personality. These commitments include popular sovereignty, universal adult franchise, parliamentary democracy, fundamental rights, secular and social justice commitments, federalism with a strong Union, judicial review, independent constitutional bodies, local self-government and a commitment to dignity through both liberty and welfare. Constitutional identity is not exhausted by the text of the Constitution. It is shaped by institutions, political conventions, judicial doctrines, administrative habits, public finance and citizen expectations.

The Constitution of India is a rare example of a transformative yet conservative founding document. It preserved institutional continuity where necessary, but repurposed the State toward social revolution. It gave India a parliamentary form of government, a federal scheme, justiciable fundamental rights, non-justiciable yet normatively powerful Directive Principles, affirmative action, independent courts, emergency powers, constitutional amendment and multiple safeguards for cultural and territorial diversity. This combination made India neither a minimal liberal constitution nor a purely developmental state charter. It made India a constitutional democracy in which law, representation, rights, welfare and state capacity were expected to reinforce one another.

The central concern of this paper is that by 2047 the pressures on this constitutional identity will be qualitatively different from those faced in 1950. Governance will be mediated by data, digital identities, platforms, automated decision systems and integrated welfare databases. Urbanisation, climate stress, internal migration, demographic change and uneven state capacity will test the federal compact. The electorate will remain vast and diverse, but citizens will demand not only the right to vote but the right to be heard, served and protected. The Constitution's identity will therefore be measured by how effectively it can translate democratic consent into accountable governance without sacrificing liberty, plurality and federal balance.

II. NEED OF THE STUDY

The need for this study arises from the fact that constitutional endurance cannot be assumed from constitutional age alone. Many constitutions survive formally while their democratic and federal substance weakens through administrative centralisation, institutional capture, fiscal imbalance, emergency politics, majoritarian interpretation or technological opacity. India's constitutional order has displayed remarkable resilience, but its future will depend on whether constitutional norms can govern new domains of power. By 2047, the most consequential exercises of public authority may occur not only through legislation, police action or taxation, but through data classification, algorithmic eligibility, platform regulation, fiscal conditions, intergovernmental grants and infrastructure-driven territorial transformation.

The study is also necessary because Indian constitutional debate often treats democracy, federalism and governance as separate fields. Democracy is discussed through elections and parties; federalism through centre-state relations; governance through administrative reform and service delivery. In practice, these three domains are inseparable. Electoral legitimacy without federal accommodation can create alienation in diverse regions. Federal autonomy without governance capacity can produce uneven citizenship. Administrative efficiency without democratic accountability can become technocratic domination. The constitutional identity of 2047 must therefore be studied as an integrated framework.

A further need arises from India's stated aspiration to become a developed nation by 2047. Developmental ambition will require infrastructure, investment, urban management, skilling, welfare delivery, environmental regulation and public finance at scale. Such capacity cannot be built through executive acceleration alone. It must be constitutionalised through legality, transparency, accountability, inclusion and decentralised participation. Otherwise, the pursuit of speed may erode the very constitutional legitimacy on which state authority depends.

III. OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

The first objective is to identify the core elements of India's constitutional identity and assess how they may evolve by 2047. The second objective is to examine the relationship between democracy, federalism and governance as mutually reinforcing dimensions of constitutional practice. The third objective is to evaluate the institutional pressures that may affect constitutional performance by 2047, including electoral scale, fiscal federalism, judicial capacity, local government, digital governance and public service delivery. The fourth objective is to propose legislative and institutional reforms that can strengthen constitutional identity in the centenary year of independence.

The paper does not treat constitutional identity as a purely symbolic question. It treats it as an operational test: whether the citizen can experience the Constitution through fair representation, equal protection, accessible remedies, responsive local government, transparent administration and meaningful participation in public decisions.

IV. RESEARCH QUESTIONS

This paper is organised around five research questions. First, what are the constitutive elements of India's constitutional identity? Second, how will democracy need to evolve by 2047 to remain substantively constitutional rather than merely electoral? Third, what form of federalism will be necessary for governing a developed, diverse and highly urbanised India? Fourth, how can governance capacity be expanded without undermining constitutional liberty, equality, accountability and privacy? Fifth, what legal and institutional reforms can align India's 2047 developmental ambition with its constitutional morality?

V. REVIEW OF LITERATURE AND CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE

Indian constitutional scholarship has generally approached the Constitution through three overlapping traditions: nationalist founding, social transformation and institutional balancing. The nationalist tradition emphasises popular sovereignty and the conversion of anti-colonial struggle into democratic self-rule. The transformative tradition views the Constitution as an instrument for dismantling hierarchy, expanding equality and enabling social citizenship. The institutional tradition studies the distribution of power among Parliament, executive, judiciary, states, constitutional bodies and local governments.

The basic structure doctrine is central to any discussion of constitutional identity. In *Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala*, the Supreme Court held that Parliament's amending power does not extend to destroying the basic structure of the Constitution. The doctrine converted constitutional identity into a judicially enforceable limit on formal amendment. Later cases strengthened this idea by treating judicial review, limited government, federalism, secularism, free and fair elections and the balance between Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles as essential features of the constitutional scheme.

Minerva Mills v. Union of India is particularly important because it rejected the idea that constitutional transformation can be achieved by subordinating rights entirely to directive governance. The Court insisted that the harmony between Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles is part of the Constitution's basic structure. This principle is crucial for 2047 because developmental governance will require welfare, redistribution and planning, but it cannot constitutionally justify unrestricted executive power or rights dilution.

S.R. Bommai v. Union of India remains a foundational federalism case because it imposed constitutional discipline on the use of Article 356 and affirmed the role of federalism and secularism in the basic structure. The case illustrates that constitutional identity is protected not only by textual allocation of powers but also by judicially enforceable principles against partisan misuse of extraordinary powers. In a 2047 context of multi-party state politics and national developmental coordination, this jurisprudence will remain essential.

Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India expanded India's rights tradition by recognising privacy as intrinsic to life and personal liberty. Its importance for 2047 lies in the fact that the State's developmental capacity will increasingly be data-driven. Welfare databases, digital health systems, education platforms, taxation analytics, predictive policing, urban surveillance and artificial intelligence will all require a constitutional framework grounded in dignity, proportionality, legality, necessity, purpose limitation and accountability.

The jurisprudence on Delhi's constitutional status, particularly the Government of NCT of Delhi line of cases, shows that federalism in India cannot be reduced to a binary between Union and States. Metropolitan governance, Union territories, asymmetrical arrangements, Sixth Schedule areas, special provisions for states and local governments create a layered federal system. By 2047, India's constitutional identity will depend on how well it manages these layers without collapsing diversity into administrative uniformity.

VI. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The study follows a qualitative doctrinal and policy-foresight methodology. It uses constitutional text, Supreme Court jurisprudence, official constitutional and institutional documents, election-related public material, finance commission material and secondary scholarship. The method is doctrinal because it analyses constitutional provisions, principles and cases. It is also policy-foresight oriented because it projects how existing constitutional principles may apply to governance conditions likely to intensify by 2047.

The universe of the study is the Indian constitutional order as it relates to democracy, federalism and governance. The primary sources include the Constitution of India, constitutional amendment history and landmark judgments on basic structure, federalism, rights, elections and governance. Secondary sources include constitutional theory, public law scholarship, public administration literature and policy analysis. The study does not conduct field surveys or quantitative modelling; its findings are normative and institutional rather than statistical.

The limitation of the study is that 2047 projections necessarily involve uncertainty. Institutional developments, political alignments, economic trajectories, demographic change, technological disruption and judicial doctrine may evolve in unexpected ways. The paper therefore avoids deterministic prediction. It identifies constitutional risks, reform pathways and institutional design principles that are likely to remain relevant across multiple scenarios.

VII. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: CONSTITUTIONAL IDENTITY AT 100

Constitutional identity in India can be understood through three mutually dependent dimensions: democratic legitimacy, federal accommodation and governance capacity. Democratic legitimacy means that power is authorised by the people through free, fair and meaningful political processes. Federal accommodation means that diversity is represented through territorial, linguistic, fiscal and institutional arrangements that prevent over-centralisation. Governance capacity means that the State can deliver security, justice, welfare, infrastructure and regulation in a lawful and accountable manner.

The distinctive feature of India is that none of these dimensions can succeed in isolation. A highly elected government may still undermine constitutional identity if it weakens independent institutions, disables opposition, bypasses Parliament or treats dissent as illegitimacy. A formally federal system may still fail if states lack fiscal autonomy, local governments lack resources or intergovernmental forums become ceremonial. A capable administration may still be unconstitutional if it relies on opacity, surveillance or exclusion. Constitutional identity is therefore a balance of power, purpose and process.

Table 1: Conceptual Dimensions of Constitutional Identity in 2047

| Dimension | Constitutional basis | 2047 pressure point | Operational test |
|---------------------|---|---|---|
| Democracy | Preamble, universal franchise, parliamentary government, free and fair elections | Electoral scale, campaign finance, misinformation, weakened deliberation | Citizens can vote, contest, dissent, access information and hold representatives accountable. |
| Federalism | Union-State distribution, Finance Commission, Inter-State Council, special provisions, local government | Fiscal imbalance, climate adaptation, migration, urbanisation, asymmetrical claims | Policy is coordinated without erasing state autonomy or local voice. |
| Rights and dignity | Fundamental Rights, judicial review, due process, equality and liberty jurisprudence | Digital surveillance, algorithmic exclusion, majoritarian pressure, security claims | State action remains lawful, proportionate, reviewable and non-discriminatory. |
| Governance capacity | Directive Principles, administrative law, constitutional bodies, public finance | Delivery at scale, infrastructure acceleration, regulatory complexity, citizen expectations | The State delivers services efficiently while remaining transparent and accountable. |

VIII. DEMOCRACY IN 2047: FROM ELECTORAL SCALE TO CONSTITUTIONAL DEPTH

India's democratic identity is rooted in the founding decision to adopt universal adult franchise despite poverty, illiteracy and social hierarchy. This decision made citizenship prior to social status. It created a constitutional republic in which political equality

was not postponed until economic development. The continuing scale of Indian elections remains one of the world's most important democratic achievements. However, by 2047 the constitutional challenge will be to deepen democracy beyond periodic voting.

Three democratic deficits require attention. The first is deliberative deficit. Parliament and state legislatures must become forums of scrutiny, not merely arenas for political signalling. If major laws are passed without adequate committee review, consultation or reasoned debate, electoral majority becomes procedurally thin. The second is information deficit. Citizens cannot exercise meaningful sovereignty in an environment polluted by opaque political finance, misinformation, manipulated digital communication or inaccessible public data. The third is representation deficit. Women, marginalised communities, migrants, informal workers, persons with disabilities and younger citizens must find effective representation not only in candidate lists but in policy design.

The Constitution (One Hundred and Sixth Amendment) Act, 2023, which provides for reservation of seats for women in the House of the People, State Legislative Assemblies and the Legislative Assembly of the National Capital Territory of Delhi, represents a major future-facing democratic reform, though its commencement depends on delimitation after the relevant census process. By 2047, the measure's success should be judged not only by numerical presence but by legislative agenda-setting, committee leadership, party democracy and constituency responsiveness.

Democracy in 2047 will also require constitutional regulation of the digital public sphere. Campaigns, political advertising, deepfakes, micro-targeting and platform amplification can affect electoral fairness. The Constitution does not require a technologically frozen model of elections. It requires that new technologies be governed by principles of equality, transparency and freedom. Election law must therefore evolve from regulating posters, speeches and expenditure toward regulating data, algorithms and coordinated information manipulation.

Finally, constitutional democracy requires institutional independence. The Election Commission, judiciary, Comptroller and Auditor General, information commissions, anti-corruption bodies and parliamentary committees are not external restraints on democracy; they are democracy's internal architecture. By 2047, India's constitutional identity will depend on whether these institutions command trust across parties, states and citizens.

IX. FEDERALISM IN 2047: COOPERATION, COMPETITION AND CONSTITUTIONAL TRUST

Indian federalism is often described as federal in structure with a strong unitary bias. This description is accurate but incomplete. The Constitution deliberately created a strong Union to preserve unity, coordinate development, manage emergencies and prevent fragmentation. At the same time, it recognised linguistic, cultural and territorial diversity through states, legislative lists, fiscal transfers, language protections, special provisions and later local self-government. The result is not classical dual federalism but a dynamic union of accommodation.

By 2047, federalism will face at least five major pressures. First, economic development will be spatially uneven. Some states and cities will contribute disproportionately to national output, while others will require redistributive support. Fiscal federalism must therefore balance equity, efficiency and incentives. Second, climate change will create region-specific governance burdens related to water, heat, floods, agriculture and coastal protection. Third, internal migration will demand portability of welfare, education, health and voting arrangements. Fourth, urban governance will require coordination across municipalities, development authorities, state agencies and Union schemes. Fifth, national security and digital infrastructure will increase the Union's role in domains traditionally managed locally.

The Finance Commission mechanism will remain central because fiscal federalism is the material basis of constitutional federalism. A state cannot exercise meaningful constitutional responsibility if it is dependent on uncertain grants, scheme conditions or delayed transfers. Equally, national development cannot succeed if states lack fiscal discipline or capacity. The 2047 federal settlement should therefore be built on predictable devolution, transparent grants, outcome-sensitive but non-coercive incentives, and stronger state finance commissions for local bodies.

Cooperative federalism should not mean executive consultation after decisions have already been made. It should mean institutionalised prior consultation, shared data, reasoned disagreement, time-bound dispute resolution and respect for state experimentation. Competitive federalism should not become a race to dilute labour, environmental or welfare protections. It should encourage innovation while preserving constitutional floors. The Inter-State Council, GST Council, zonal councils and sector-specific councils must therefore be strengthened as deliberative constitutional forums rather than treated as episodic administrative meetings.

Asymmetrical federalism will also matter. Special provisions for certain regions, tribal areas, hill states and border areas are not exceptions to constitutional identity; they are expressions of India's plural federal imagination. A uniform administrative template may produce apparent efficiency, but in a society of India's diversity it can also produce alienation. Federalism in 2047 must be judged by whether it allows unity without sameness.

X. GOVERNANCE IN 2047: CAPACITY UNDER CONSTITUTIONAL DISCIPLINE

Governance capacity is the third pillar of constitutional identity. A Constitution that guarantees rights but cannot deliver justice, welfare, infrastructure or security risks becoming aspirational without being effective. Conversely, a State that delivers services but disregards legality, privacy, participation and accountability risks becoming administratively powerful but constitutionally weak. The task for 2047 is to build a high-capacity constitutional state.

The first challenge is public service delivery. Welfare schemes, health systems, education, housing, nutrition, land records, policing and municipal services must be citizen-centric. Digital platforms can reduce leakage and improve monitoring, but they can

also produce exclusion when authentication fails, data are wrong, grievance systems are inaccessible or eligibility rules are opaque. Every digital welfare system should therefore include legal notice, human review, offline alternatives, appeal mechanisms and audit trails.

The second challenge is judicial and administrative justice. Rights are meaningful only when remedies are timely. Court pendency, delayed investigations, under-resourced tribunals and weak legal aid can convert formal rights into delayed rights. Governance reform for 2047 must include judicial infrastructure, procedural simplification, technology with safeguards, alternative dispute resolution and stronger first-instance administrative accountability. The objective should be to prevent rights violations before they require years of litigation.

The third challenge is regulatory governance. A developed India will need sophisticated regulation of finance, energy, health technology, education, artificial intelligence, environment, competition, labour platforms and urban infrastructure. Regulatory bodies must be independent, transparent, expert and accountable to Parliament or state legislatures. Rule-making must include consultation and impact assessment. Otherwise, regulatory power may migrate into opaque executive discretion.

The fourth challenge is local government. The 73rd and 74th constitutional amendments created a constitutional basis for panchayats and municipalities, but local bodies often remain financially and administratively dependent. By 2047, meaningful constitutional identity will require empowered gram panchayats, municipalities, metropolitan governance institutions and district planning processes. Citizens experience the State most directly through local roads, waste, water, health centres, schools, policing interfaces and local welfare offices. If local government is weak, constitutional citizenship remains distant.

XI. SCENARIO ANALYSIS: POSSIBLE PATHWAYS TO 2047

The future of India's constitutional identity is not predetermined. Four broad scenarios can be imagined. In a constitutional deepening scenario, electoral legitimacy is matched by institutional independence, federal consultation, local empowerment and rights-based digital governance. In an administrative acceleration scenario, the State expands capacity quickly but neglects deliberation and safeguards. In a fragmented federal scenario, fiscal and political conflicts between Union and states reduce policy coherence. In a rights-resilience scenario, courts and civil society continue to protect liberties but governance capacity remains uneven. The preferred pathway is constitutional deepening because it integrates legitimacy, diversity and capacity.

Scenario thinking is useful because it prevents a purely celebratory or purely pessimistic account. India has strong constitutional assets: a written Constitution, regular elections, an independent judiciary, a vibrant public sphere, federal diversity, administrative experience and civic constitutionalism. It also faces serious risks: institutional overload, polarisation, inequality, digital opacity, fiscal stress, environmental pressure and uneven state capacity. The centenary moment should therefore be used for renewal rather than ritual.

Table 2: 2047 Constitutional Risk and Mitigation Matrix

| Area | Constitutional risk | Mitigation for 2047 | Primary institutional forum |
|-----------------------|--|---|--|
| Elections | Opaque finance, misinformation and unequal digital campaigning | Real-time disclosure, platform audit rules, deepfake controls and stronger model code enforcement | Election Commission, Parliament, parties |
| Parliamentary process | Weak scrutiny and ordinance-style governance by speed | Mandatory committee referral for major bills and public consultation standards | Parliament and state legislatures |
| Federal finance | Vertical and horizontal fiscal distrust | Predictable devolution, transparent grants and empowered state finance commissions | Finance Commission, GST Council |
| Digital governance | Surveillance, exclusion and algorithmic opacity | Rights-based data governance, human review, audit trails and independent oversight | Parliament, regulators, courts |
| Local government | Constitutional status without fiscal and administrative capacity | Municipal and panchayat finance reform, cadre support and metropolitan governance law | States, State Finance Commissions |
| Justice delivery | Delayed remedies and inaccessible courts | Procedural reform, judicial capacity, legal aid and administrative grievance redress | Judiciary, Law Ministries |

XII. FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

The first finding is that India's constitutional identity is best understood as a balance between permanence and adaptability. The basic structure doctrine protects the Constitution from destructive amendment, but it does not freeze constitutional development.

The Constitution can adapt to digital governance, urban federalism, climate governance and new welfare forms as long as adaptation remains faithful to democracy, rights, federalism and judicial review.

The second finding is that democracy by 2047 must be assessed through constitutional depth, not merely electoral continuity. Free and fair elections are indispensable, but they are not sufficient. A democracy also requires deliberative legislatures, accountable parties, opposition space, transparent political finance, independent election management, media freedom, citizen access to information and protection of dissent. Without these conditions, formal electoral legitimacy may coexist with constitutional thinning.

The third finding is that federalism will be the principal governance technology of 2047. India cannot be governed effectively by uniform central command or by isolated state autonomy. It requires structured cooperation, fiscal trust, state-level experimentation and local implementation. Federalism is not an obstacle to development; it is the constitutional method through which development can be adapted to regional realities.

The fourth finding is that governance capacity must be constitutionalised. The future State will increasingly govern through platforms, databases, predictive analytics, automated eligibility systems and integrated dashboards. Such tools can improve efficiency, but they must be governed by law, audit, appeal, privacy, transparency and non-discrimination. Constitutional identity in 2047 will depend on whether technology is treated as a servant of rights or as an escape from accountability.

The fifth finding is that local self-government is the missing link between constitutional design and citizen experience. India has constitutionalised panchayats and municipalities, but the promise remains incomplete without predictable finance, staff, planning powers and accountability. By 2047, the quality of constitutional democracy will be visible in gram sabhas, municipal councils, ward committees and district planning, not only in Parliament and state capitals.

The sixth finding is that constitutional morality must become an administrative norm. Constitutional morality is often invoked in courts, but its deeper role is to discipline everyday governance. It requires public officials to treat citizens as rights-bearing equals, minorities as constitutional co-owners, opposition as legitimate, states as partners, courts as constitutional guardians and public resources as trust property.

XIII. LEGISLATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS

First, India should consider a Democracy Integrity and Electoral Transparency framework before 2047. Such a framework should address political finance disclosure, digital campaign transparency, misinformation, deepfake labelling, party candidate selection transparency and stronger penalties for systematic voter intimidation. The aim should not be to over-regulate political speech, but to protect electoral equality and informed choice.

Second, Parliament and state legislatures should adopt a Legislative Process Standards Act or binding rules requiring pre-legislative consultation, explanatory memoranda, financial impact statements, federal impact notes and committee scrutiny for major bills. Speed may be necessary in emergencies, but routine law-making should be deliberative. The quality of legislation is central to governance capacity.

Third, intergovernmental consultation should be institutionalised through a Federal Consultation and Dispute Resolution Act. The Inter-State Council should meet regularly, publish agendas and produce reasoned recommendations. Sectoral councils for health, education, climate, water, digital governance and urbanisation should be linked with fiscal incentives and data-sharing protocols.

Fourth, fiscal federalism should be strengthened through transparent devolution, predictable grants, stronger state finance commissions and a constitutional culture of timely transfers. Centrally sponsored schemes should be rationalised to reduce fragmentation and allow state adaptation. Outcome measurement should be cooperative, not coercive.

Fifth, local government must be made financially viable. States should enact municipal and panchayat finance laws that guarantee formula-based transfers, empower own-source revenue, create professional local cadres and strengthen ward committees and gram sabhas. Metropolitan regions need accountable governance structures that integrate transport, housing, land use, water, waste and climate resilience.

Sixth, India needs a rights-based digital governance code. The code should cover public sector data processing, algorithmic decision-making, automated welfare eligibility, biometric systems, public dashboards, artificial intelligence procurement, cybersecurity and citizen grievance redress. Every automated public decision affecting rights, welfare or obligations should be explainable, reviewable and appealable to a human authority.

Seventh, judicial and administrative remedies should be redesigned for speed and accessibility. This requires more judges, better court management, tribunal reform, legal aid expansion, technology with due process safeguards and statutory time limits for administrative appeals. Constitutional rights should not depend on a citizen's ability to litigate for years.

Eighth, constitutional education should become a national civic mission by 2047. Schools, colleges, civil service training academies, police academies, local government training institutes and digital public platforms should teach constitutional values in practical form. Citizens should understand not only the Preamble but also how to file grievances, access information, participate in local bodies and hold institutions accountable.

Ninth, India should publish a periodic Constitutional Governance Report assessing democracy, federalism, rights, public finance, local government, judicial access and administrative accountability. Such a report could be produced by a non-partisan

consortium of constitutional bodies, universities and public policy institutions. It would convert constitutional identity from rhetoric into measurable governance practice.

XIV. CONCLUSION

India's constitutional identity at the centenary of independence will be tested by the relationship between power and restraint. A developed India in 2047 will require a capable State, but the Indian constitutional tradition does not permit capacity to become a justification for domination. It requires capacity under law, development with dignity, unity through accommodation and democracy with institutional depth.

The Constitution has endured because it is both a legal document and a political ethic. It gives governments authority, but it also reminds them that authority is fiduciary. It gives citizens rights, but it also invites fraternity and constitutional responsibility. It gives the Union strength, but it also protects states, local bodies and plural identities. It gives courts review power, but it also expects legislatures and executives to internalise constitutional limits.

By 2047, the core question will not be whether India celebrates the Constitution, but whether the Constitution governs the ordinary exercise of power. If electoral competition remains fair, Parliament deliberates, states are treated as partners, local bodies are empowered, technology is accountable, rights are enforceable and welfare is delivered with dignity, India's constitutional identity will not merely survive at 100; it will deepen. If, however, development is pursued by weakening deliberation, centralising authority, bypassing institutions or converting citizens into data subjects without remedies, constitutional identity will become ceremonial. The future therefore demands constitutional renewal: a deliberate project to align democracy, federalism and governance with the moral promise of the Republic.

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